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FROM CLIMATE CHANGE AND HURRICANES TO 
ECOLOGICAL NUISANCES:  
COMMON LAW REMEDIES FOR PUBLIC  
LAW FAILURES? 
Stephen M. Johnson* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, there has been a minor renaissance in the 
use of common law actions, especially public and private nuisance, to 
address environmental problems not being adequately addressed by 
public law, such as climate change and natural disasters like 
Hurricane Katrina.1 Ever since the explosion of public law in 
response to environmental problems in the 1970s, the common law 
has provided remedies for personal injury and property damage that 
are not available under public law,2 and avenues of relief for 
problems that were ignored by public law. The common law and 
public law should not, however, be viewed as alternatives for 
addressing environmental problems, but as complements. There is an 
Escheresque quality to the relationship between public law and 
common law, in that public law continues to evolve in light of 
developments in the common law, while the common law is 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Associate Dean and Professor, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. B.S., J.D. 
Villanova University, LL.M. George Washington University School of Law. 
 1. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated, reh’g granted en 
banc, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010); Connecticut v. 
Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. 
Supp. 2d 644 (E.D. La. 2009); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007); Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d. 676 (E.D. La. 
2006).  
 2. The federal environmental statutes, such as the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, and Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, provide for civil and criminal penalties, as well as injunctive relief, but 
do not authorize courts to award money damages. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean 
Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1365 (2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6928, 6972 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7604 (2006). The Superfund law 
authorizes courts to award “response costs” to plaintiffs but not money damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 
(2006).  
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influenced, in turn, by developments in public law.3 Vibrant common 
law remedies are an essential complement to public law for effective 
programs to minimize harms to the environment and human health.  
Several recent federal court decisions involving nuisance or 
negligence claims for damages related to climate change and 
Hurricane Katrina appear, at first blush, to provide strong incentives 
for an even greater focus on common law to address environmental 
problems. Private nuisance actions could potentially be used more 
widely to address destruction or degradation of waters or wetlands 
that are no longer protected by the Clean Water Act or habitats that 
are not protected by the Endangered Species Act, or problems created 
by non-point source pollution, non-hazardous waste management, or 
locally unwanted land use siting.4 Similarly, public nuisance lawsuits 
could potentially target other actions that contribute to global climate 
change or address problems that may be caused in the future by 
nanotechnology, new toxic chemicals, or new uses of existing toxic 
chemicals.5  
However, the recent federal court decisions should not be viewed 
as fundamentally altering the role that common law actions play in 
protecting the environment and human health. It will still be difficult 
to rely on the common law to solve these broader environmental 
problems. The recent decisions removed some jurisdictional and 
standing barriers to common law actions, but many impediments 
remain. The primary impediment, which was not significantly 
affected by the recent decisions, is the difficulty of proving causation 
in the common law actions.6 The recent decisions may have made it 
easier to bring common law actions but not necessarily to win them. 
Furthermore, the decisions leave several standing and preemption 
questions unresolved, so it may not even be easier than before to 
bring common law actions in some circumstances.  
                                                                                                                 
 3. See Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 
IOWA L. REV. 545, 547–49 (2007).  
 4. See infra notes 162–72 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra Part V.A.   
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To the extent that the recent decisions spark an increase in 
common law litigation to address some of the problems not addressed 
by public law, though, the litigation could spur legislative changes to 
the public law. Consequently, the decisions may ultimately have a 
greater impact on public law than on common law.   
Part I of this article explores the role that the common law played 
in addressing environmental problems prior to the development of a 
robust public law regime in the 1970s and the changing role of 
common law as the new regime was implemented. Part II of the 
article examines the reasons why there has been a renaissance in 
common law actions and why the trend could continue. Part III of the 
article discusses the recent federal appellate court decisions that 
could accelerate the common law renaissance, as well as some other 
recent federal court decisions that could slow the renaissance. All of 
these decisions involved harm caused by global climate change, 
Hurricane Katrina, or both. Part IV of the article identifies 
environmental problems not adequately addressed under public law 
that might be the subject of more aggressive common law 
enforcement if the renaissance continues and discusses the 
advantages of addressing those problems through common law 
actions. Finally, Part V explores the continuing limitations of 
common law that have not been remedied by the recent decisions.  
I.  THE 1970S: THE ASCENDANCY OF PUBLIC LAW 
From the dawn of the age of industrialization, the common law 
developed as a powerful tool to address pollution problems.7 Private 
parties and governments sought to combat environmental problems 
through public and private nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict 
liability lawsuits.8 State and federal courts frequently awarded 
damages to neighbors of paper mills, refineries, chemical factories, 
and other industries that were harmed by pollution from those 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See J.B. RUHL, JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & JAMES SALZMAN, THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 930–31 (1st ed. 2008).  
 8. See Klass, supra note 3, at 567.  
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activities, or the activities themselves were enjoined.9 Although many 
of the lawsuits were based on state common law, some of the 
lawsuits involving interstate pollution were brought under federal 
common law.10 
Over time, however, federal, state and local governments adopted 
laws and regulations to address environmental problems. Although 
the trend began with state and local efforts early in the twentieth 
century,11 public environmental law became ubiquitous with the 
flood of federal environmental legislation in the 1970s.12 As public 
environmental law grew, the number of common law environmental 
claims declined sharply.13  
While common law claims declined, neither Congress nor the 
states sought to fully displace common law remedies by adopting 
environmental protection statutes and regulations. Indeed, most of the 
federal environmental statutes include provisions that explicitly 
preserve more stringent state and local remedies.14 In some cases, the 
adoption of federal statutes will eliminate federal common law 
remedies. For instance, in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, the Supreme 
Court held that the Clean Water Act displaced federal common law 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See, e.g., City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Georgia v. 
Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 140 F. 951, 952–
53 (C.C.D. Utah 1904); Steifer v. City of Kansas City, 267 P.2d 474 (Kan. 1954); Susquehanna 
Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 20 A. 900, 902 (Md. 1890); Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 101 N.E. 805 
(N.Y. 1913); Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 690 (N.C. 1953); Martin v. Reynolds Metals 
Co., 342 P.2d 790, 794 (Or. 1959); Costas v. City of Fond du Lac, 129 N.W.2d 217 (Wis. 1964). 
 10. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (dealing with 
interstate water pollution); Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. 230 (addressing interstate air pollution).  
 11. See Klass, supra note 3, at 567; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: 
A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 578–79 (2001). 
 12. See Klass, supra note 3, at 567; ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. 
MILLER & JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE & POLICY 88 (6th ed. 
2009).  
 13. See H. Marlow Green, Can the Common Law Survive in the Modern Statutory Environment?, 8 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 109 (1998) (finding a sharp decline in the number of common law 
actions brought after 1975); see also J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
753, 754 (2008). Professor J.B. Ruhl suggests that the explosion of public law diminished the use of 
nuisance law to address species and habitat protection just as it diminished the use of nuisance law to 
address pollution control problems. Id. at 755–56. 
 14. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(e), 1370 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6929, 6972(f) (2006); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9614 (2006).  
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nuisance claims involving discharges of water pollution that were 
regulated by the Act’s permitting program.15  
The reach of City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, however, is limited. 
First, the Court did not find that federal common law was displaced 
merely because Congress had enacted federal water pollution 
legislation. Instead, the Court analyzed the structure of the statute and 
concluded that Congress implicitly displaced federal common law 
with respect to the plaintiff’s claim because Congress established a 
comprehensive regulatory program to address the pollution 
discharges that were at issue in the case.16 It is possible, therefore, 
that the Court may find that other federal environmental statutes that 
do not establish a comprehensive permitting program to address 
environmental problems do not displace federal common law.17 
More importantly, though the Supreme Court, in City of 
Milwaukee v. Illinois, held that the Clean Water Act displaced federal 
common law regarding the discharges involved in the case, the Court 
did not foreclose state common law actions.18 Significantly, several 
years later, in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the Supreme 
Court concluded that although the Clean Water Act displaced federal 
common law actions regarding water pollution discharges that are 
regulated under the Act’s comprehensive permitting program, the Act 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317.  
 16. Id. (“We conclude that, at least so far as concerns the claims of respondents, Congress has not 
left the formulation of appropriate federal standards to the courts through application of often vague and 
indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence, but rather has occupied the field 
through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert 
administrative agency.”).  
 17. For instance, Professor Randall Abate argues that the Clean Air Act should not be interpreted as 
displacing federal common law regarding greenhouse gas pollution from automobiles because the statute 
does not establish a comprehensive regulatory system to address such pollution in the way that the 
amended Clean Water Act regulated point source discharges of water pollution. See Randall S. Abate, 
Automobile Emissions and Climate Change Impacts: Employing Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a 
“Global Warming Solution” in California, 40 CONN. L. REV. 591, 605–07 (2008). Professor Jonathan 
Zasloff disagrees, arguing that the statute should be read to displace federal common law regarding harm 
caused by greenhouse gases. See Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public 
Nuisance and Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827, 1848–49 (2008). Professor Zasloff relies, in 
part, on the suggestion by Justice Rehnquist, in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, that the Court “start[s] with 
the assumption” that statutes displace federal common law, due to separation of powers principles. 
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317. Part III of this Article examines some of the recent federal court 
decisions that explore the Clean Air Act, greenhouse gases, and displacement of federal common law.  
 18. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 327–29.  
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does not preempt state common law actions for harm caused by those 
discharges, as long as the actions are based on the common law of the 
discharging state.19  
After the Court’s decision in Ouellette, it was clear that while the 
common law’s role in addressing environmental problems was 
diminished by the development of federal, state, and local public law, 
common law was still an important tool for addressing environmental 
problems. When exploring the importance of common law in the age 
of environmental statutes, commentators often stress that the 
common law provides remedies that are not available under most 
statutes.20 While federal and state environmental statutes generally 
provide for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent future 
violations, they do not generally provide any relief for property 
damage or personal injury.21 Common law nuisance, trespass, 
negligence and strict liability actions often remain the only option for 
recovering those damages.  
In the same way that the common law provides remedies that are 
not available under public law, it can be used to address problems 
that are either not addressed under public law or not addressed 
adequately.22  
While the common law plays those important roles in the modern 
age of statutes, critics frequently assert that public law is a much 
more efficient and effective tool to address environmental problems 
and that it developed because of the failure of the common law to 
address those problems. Specifically, critics often assert that because 
judges in common law actions focus on narrow, specific issues 
involving litigants within their jurisdiction, rather than on the 
potential impact of those decisions on groups that are not involved in 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 487 (1987). Unlike the analysis regarding 
displacement of federal common law, courts begin with a presumption that federal law does not preempt 
the “historic police powers of the States . . . unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” 
Id. at 492 n.11 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).  
 20. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 12, at 101; Klass, supra note 3, at 569.  
 21. See Klass, supra note 3, at 583. Professor Alexandra Klass also notes that while the Clean Water 
Act and Clean Air Act might not authorize lawsuits to challenge pollution caused by activities that are 
authorized by a permit, persons harmed by those activities can generally still seek remedies for their 
injuries under common law. Id.  
 22. See infra notes 161–73 and accompanying text. 
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the litigation, the common law can effectively address small-scale 
local issues but cannot address broader national or international 
problems.23 Common law judges are also criticized as generalists, 
lacking the expertise to resolve the broader technical questions that 
arise in environmental disputes.24 An agency administering a statute, 
on the other hand, can collect data from a wide range of sources and 
employ experts to set pollution limits on a national or international 
basis after considering the broader impacts of limiting pollution to 
specific levels.25  
Critics also argue that public law is preferable to common law 
because the common law develops slowly, does not develop 
uniformly, and is retrospective in nature.26  
Common law and public law should not, however, be viewed as 
alternative regimes for addressing environmental problems, but as 
complementary regimes. Environmental statutes are frequently 
interpreted in light of common law principles and enacted or 
amended in response to developments in the common law.27 
Similarly, the common law has evolved and developed in response to 
the development and interpretation of public law.28 The following 
section of this article explores those interconnections more fully in 
the context of the recent mini-renaissance in common law actions. 
II.  WHY NOW?: REASONS FOR THE COMMON LAW RENAISSANCE 
While common law actions to address environmental problems 
declined with the explosion of public law, a wave of high-profile 
private and public nuisance actions over the past few years may 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 777–79; Klass, supra note 3, at 598; see also Jason J. Czarnezki & 
Mark L. Thomsen, Advancing the Rebirth of Environmental Common Law, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 1, 7 (2007).  
 24. See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 779.  
 25. See Klass, supra note 3, at 569.  
 26. See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 779; Klass, supra note 3, at 569, 583.  
 27. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1881 (2009) 
(relying on the Restatement of Torts to interpret the liability provisions of Superfund); United States v. 
Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1382 (8th Cir. 1989) (incorporating common law principles 
regarding liability for acts of independent contractors).  
 28. See Klass, supra note 3, at 584–99.  
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signal the beginning of a mini-renaissance in common law 
environmental protection actions. Professor Alexandra Klass suggests 
that the trend toward using public nuisance law and other common 
law tools to address broader environmental problems is consistent 
with an “instrumentalist” vision for the common law, where nuisance 
and other tort actions serve as a separate branch of public regulatory 
law that is intended to deter undesirable conduct, spread societal 
losses, and compensate victims of wrongdoing.29 She suggests that 
the instrumentalist vision has taken precedence over the alternative 
vision for tort law, that of corrective justice, which views the 
common law as merely a means to obtain redress for private 
wrongs.30  
Many other factors have influenced the reinvigoration of the 
common law. First, enforcement of federal and state environmental 
statutes and regulations has been weak in many areas and non-
existent in others.31 Without an effective public law option, common 
law is the only tool to address some environmental problems.  
In the past decade, the Supreme Court has also played an important 
role in reinvigorating common law actions by issuing several rulings 
based on principles of federalism and the Commerce Clause that limit 
federal authority to address environmental problems and expand state 
authority.32 The Court’s recent decisions have narrowed federal 
authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause and have spurred 
courts and agencies to interpret federal regulatory authority under 
environmental statutes more narrowly.33 Thousands of acres of 
wetlands and hundreds of miles of waters that were protected under 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1501, 1505–06, 1508 n.19 (2009).  
 30. Id. Professor Klass notes, however, that while the recent public nuisance actions to address 
climate change are examples of tort law as a form of public law, common law actions to address harm 
caused by hazardous waste disposal often resemble the private law model of tort law. Id. at 1529–36.  
 31. See Czarnezki & Thomsen, supra note 23, at 6–7; Klass, supra note 3, at 581.  
 32. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995). 
 33. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook 
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173–74 (2001). In both cases, the Court interpreted 
the Clean Water Act narrowly to avoid a question regarding whether regulation of particular intrastate 
waters under the Act violated the Commerce Clause.  
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the Federal Clean Water Act are no longer accorded the same 
protection in light of those decisions.34 The Court’s expansion of 
state power at the expense of federal power extends beyond the 
Commerce Clause, though. In fact, during the 2009 Supreme Court 
term, in every environmental case where federalism concerns were 
implicated, the Court ruled in favor of state or local governments.35 
The Court also may have increased opportunities for citizens to bring 
common law actions for harm caused by environmental problems by 
issuing a ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA that establishes a rather 
generous standing standard for environmental plaintiffs.36 Depending 
on how the case is interpreted and applied, this ruling could make it 
easier for plaintiffs to establish standing to sue even though the harm 
they suffer from pollution is caused by a variety of sources and the 
relief sought in the lawsuit does not fully redress their harm.37  
Other factors could also play a role in fostering a more significant 
increase in common law actions to protect the environment. Professor 
J.B. Ruhl argues that a growing awareness of the economic value of 
ecosystems and the development of the field of ecological economics 
could spur a wave of lawsuits to address “ecological nuisances.”38 He 
suggests that the ability to quantify the economic value of natural 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See James Murphy & Stephen M. Johnson, Significant Flaws: Why the Rapanos Guidance 
Misinterprets the Law, Fails to Protect Waters, and Provides Little Certainty, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 431, 
455–56 (2007).  
 35. See Stephen M. Johnson, The Roberts Court and the Environment, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
317, 333 (2009).  
 36. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2006). Although the case did not involve a challenge under 
common law, the standing analysis used by the Court should apply to plaintiffs in common law actions 
as well.  
 37. The Court concluded that the EPA’s actions caused the plaintiffs’ harm because they 
“contributed” to the harm, even though there were many other causes of their harm, and that the 
plaintiffs satisfied the “redressability” requirement for standing because the relief they sought would 
reduce their harm “to some extent.” Id. at 523–26. The Court stressed that the plaintiffs need not prove 
that the relief they sought would relieve their “every injury.” Id. at 525 (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 
U.S. 228, 243 n.15 (1982)). However, it is not clear how broadly the decision will be applied. As the 
Court noted in its standing analysis, it was significant that the plaintiffs in the case were states and that 
they were suing to enforce a procedural right. Id. at 517–21. 
 38. See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 756–57. Although it might still be difficult to put a precise dollar 
figure on the total value of ecosystem services, Professor Ruhl argues that there is growing recognition 
that ecosystems provide many economic values, including flood mitigation and groundwater recharge 
from wetlands, water filtration and sediment capture from forests, and nutrient cycling, gas regulation, 
thermal regulation and carbon sequestration from other ecosystems. Id.  
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resources has made it easier for plaintiffs to prove that a defendant’s 
action causes specific and measurable harms to those resources that 
have specific and measurable impacts on the plaintiffs.39  
Professor Alexandra Klass agrees that advances in science make it 
easier for plaintiffs to prevail in nuisance actions, and she argues that 
public law contributes to that dynamic by requiring the collection and 
reporting of data that can be used by litigants to prove that a 
defendant’s action is a nuisance and causes the plaintiff’s harm.40 She 
also notes that courts frequently look to the broad environmentally 
protective purposes of public laws in determining how to interpret 
and apply the common law and the appropriateness of different types 
of damages under the common law.41 She argues that public law has 
influenced the development of common law in the past and continues 
to influence the development of common law today.42 Finally, 
advocates of an expansion of common law tools to address 
environmental problems suggest that many of the traditional 
criticisms of the use of the common law are misguided. Specifically, 
they argue that the local nature of decision making in common law 
courts is often an advantage for dealing with environmental 
problems, rather than a disadvantage, because the judges, due to their 
proximity to the problem, are in a better position to determine the 
effect of an activity on a community and to balance equities to 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Id. He points out that ecological economics and the development of ecosystem services valuation 
have already caused an expansion of the common law by prompting an expansion of public trust 
principles. Id.  
 40. See Klass, supra note 3, at 591–94.  
 41. Id. at 587–89. For instance, she points out that in light of the enactment of the federal Superfund 
law, which imposes strict liability on a wide variety of persons for releases of hazardous substances, 
many state courts have held persons strictly liable under common law for environmental contamination 
caused by such releases. Id. at 587. She also notes that state courts have frequently allowed common law 
plaintiffs to recover permanent “environmental stigma damages” in addition to cleanup costs for 
contamination of their property, in light of the stigma imposed on their property by the federal 
regulatory regime for hazardous waste cleanups. Id. at 588–89.  
 42. Id. at 548–55. She notes that scholars and legal authorities including Dean Roscoe Pound, Justice 
Benjamin Cardozo, and Judge Henry Friendly have emphasized the importance of the evolution of 
common law in response to statutes. Id. All of those authorities emphasized the important role that 
common law judges play in “balancing policies with a goal of achieving a pragmatic . . . solution,” as 
opposed to simply declaring “what the law is.” Id. at 547, 549. She asserts, however, that courts have 
thus far underutilized the public law as a tool to model common law regarding environmental protection. 
Id. at 547, 557, 565. 
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determine an appropriate solution to the problem.43 Professor Ruhl 
suggests that common law courts would be particularly adept at 
addressing “ecological nuisances,” since most claims for such 
nuisances would focus on a primarily local harm.44 Many 
commentators agree that common law judges will be free from the 
political pressure that might otherwise be asserted against 
government agencies.45  
In response to claims that judges cannot weigh and balance broad 
issues with national and international impacts, advocates of common 
law actions to protect the environment argue that courts can resolve 
the environmental disputes before them without making those 
broader policy decisions.46  
III.  THE COMMON LAW RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE  
AND DISASTER 
While it is not yet clear that there has been a renaissance in 
common law actions to protect the environment, it is clear that there 
have been some high profile common law actions brought in the past 
few years to address the environmental problems that are being 
caused by global climate change and natural disasters like Hurricane 
Katrina. Both the Second and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal issued 
opinions allowing plaintiffs to proceed with nuisance actions for 
damages related to global warming, despite challenges by the 
defendants that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the claims were 
                                                                                                                 
 43. See Klass, supra note 3, at 573, 582.  
 44. See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 778.  
 45. See Klass, supra note 3, at 581.  
 46. Jonathan Zasloff argues, for instance, that courts can award money damages rather than 
injunctions for harm caused by public nuisances, in order to avoid the criticism that courts lack the 
competence to manage broad injunctions against public nuisances. See Zasloff, supra note 17, at 1838. 
One of the benefits of damages, Zasloff notes, is that the defendant can decide whether it is more 
economical to pay damages and continue to pollute, or to stop polluting. Id. Even in cases where courts 
are called upon to issue injunctions, Alexandra Klass argues that courts can decide whether to issue the 
injunction in a case like Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), by balancing the 
harms to the parties before the court rather than by examining the complex interstate air pollution issues 
that extended beyond the dispute in the case. See Klass, supra note 3, at 572.  
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non-justiciable political questions.47 The Fifth Circuit subsequently 
vacated its decision, though, when it agreed to rehear the case en 
banc.48 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is likely to address 
similar standing and justiciability questions shortly in a nuisance case 
brought by residents of Kivalina, Alaska, a small village that is 
disappearing due to global climate change.49 In addition to those 
developments in climate change litigation, the federal courts in 
Louisiana have issued some significant rulings recently in common 
law actions related to damage caused by hurricanes.50 
A.  Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. 
In September 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that a coalition of states and land trusts could 
proceed with litigation against several electric power companies for 
injuries that the plaintiffs suffered due to global climate change 
caused, in part, by defendants’ emission of greenhouse gases.51 The 
plaintiffs in that case, Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 
brought federal and state common law public nuisance claims and 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, rather than money 
damages.52 The court held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, the 
claims were justiciable and governed by federal common law, which 
was not displaced, and the plaintiffs stated claims for nuisance under 
federal common law.53  
                                                                                                                 
 47. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated, reh’g granted en banc, 
598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010); Connecticut v. Am. 
Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 48. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 
(5th Cir. 2010). 
 49. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). An 
earlier case in the Ninth Circuit brought by the State of California against auto manufacturers addressed 
similar issues. See California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, 
at *5–8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).  
 50. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644 (E.D. La. 2007); Barasich 
v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d. 676 (E.D. La. 2006).  
 51. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009). New York City was also 
a plaintiff in the case. Id. at 316.  
 52. Id. at 315. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked the court to cap the carbon dioxide emissions by the 
defendants and then to reduce the emissions by a specified percentage each year for ten years. Id. at 314.  
 53. Id. at 315. 
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The Second Circuit heard the case when the plaintiffs appealed the 
district court’s decision to dismiss the case on the grounds that it 
raised non-justiciable political questions.54 The Second Circuit 
stressed that “‘[t]he political question doctrine must be cautiously 
invoked,’ and simply because an issue may have political 
implications does not make it non-justiciable.”55 Applying the six 
factors articulated by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr,56 the court 
reversed the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs’ claims were 
non-justiciable.57 With regard to the first factor, the court held that 
the issue in the case was not textually committed to Congress or the 
Executive branch.58 Importantly, the court recognized that the 
plaintiffs were not asking the court to fashion a comprehensive 
solution to global climate change but were merely seeking to limit 
emissions from six domestic coal-fired power plants that were 
allegedly causing a public nuisance.59 The court concluded that in the 
common law nuisance case at bar, “[t]he department to whom this 
issue has been ‘constitutionally committed’ is none other than our 
own—the Judiciary.”60 With regard to the second Baker factor, the 
court concluded that there were judicially manageable standards 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. at 314. The district court determined that the case was non-justiciable based on the third 
Baker factor, finding that the plaintiffs’ claims were “impossib[le] [to] decid[e] without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.” Id. at 319 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). 
 55. Id. at 323 (citation omitted) (quoting Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
 56. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (“Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a 
political question is found [(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or [(3)] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [(4)] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [(5)] an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [(6)] the potentiality 
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”).  
 57. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 324–32. 
 58. Id. at 325.  
 59. Id. The defendants had argued, to the contrary, that resolution of the case would impermissibly 
interfere with the President’s authority to manage foreign relations. Id. at 324. The court noted that its 
decision would not bind parties not before the court and would not set across the board domestic 
emissions standards. Id. at 325.  
 60. Id. at 325 (alteration in original) (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 
(2d Cir. 1991)).  
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available for the court to use to resolve the claims.61 Although global 
climate change creates broader problems, the court counseled that it 
was merely being asked to resolve a public nuisance action against 
six defendants and “that federal courts have successfully adjudicated 
complex common law public nuisance cases for over a century.”62 
With regard to the third Baker factor, the court held that it was not 
necessary to await an initial policy determination to resolve the 
plaintiffs’ claims.63 The court noted that while Congress has not 
agreed on a comprehensive plan to address global climate change, the 
actions that Congress and the Executive Branch have taken suggest 
that they favor reducing greenhouse gas emissions.64 After 
determining that the issue was not a non-justiciable political question 
based on the other three Baker factors, the court suggested that 
Congress or the EPA could ultimately overrule any decision that the 
court made in this common law nuisance action if they disagreed 
with the approach taken by the court.65  
After rejecting the defendants’ non-justiciability argument, the 
court addressed the question of the plaintiffs’ standing, which the 
district court had declined to address.66 The court was reviewing the 
standing question in the context of the defendants’ motion to dismiss 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Id. at 329. The defendants argued that resolution of the claims would require the court to resolve 
issues for which there are no standards, including how far domestic and global emissions should be 
reduced, whether power plants or automobiles should be required to reduce their emissions, and what 
impacts the reductions would have on jobs, the economy and security. Id. at 326.  
 62. Id. at 326, 329. As the court stressed, “The question presented here is discrete, focusing on 
Defendants’ alleged public nuisance and Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. As the States eloquently put it, 
‘[t]hat Plaintiffs’ injuries are part of a worldwide problem does not mean Defendants’ contribution to 
that problem cannot be addressed through principled adjudication.’” Id. at 329 (alteration in original). 
 63. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 331. 
 64. Id. The court held that Congress’s failure to adopt comprehensive greenhouse gas legislation did 
not demonstrate Congress’s intent to supplant common law. Id. In fact, although Congress and the 
Executive Branch have not yet adopted a comprehensive strategy to address climate change, the court 
pointed out the following: 
It is . . . fair to say that the Executive [B]ranch and Congress have not indicated they 
favor increasing greenhouse gases. On the contrary, the political branches are at the very 
least concerned about global warming, and Congress has passed laws that call for study 
of climate change and research into technologies that will reduce emissions. 
Id.  
 65. Id. at 332.  
 66. Id. at 332–33. The court noted “that when a lower court dismisses a case without deciding 
whether standing exists and the basis for the dismissal [is overturned],” the reviewing court has an 
obligation to address the standing issue sua sponte. Id.  
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at the pleading stage, so the court applied a less rigorous standard of 
review than it would have applied at a later stage of litigation.67 Since 
the group of plaintiffs included states, as well as land trusts, the court 
began its standing analysis by focusing on the standing rules that 
apply to states when they are suing in their parens patriae capacity.68 
The court suggested that it was unclear whether a lower standard that 
previously applied when states sued in their parens patriae capacity69 
was still applicable after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.70 However, the court concluded that it was not 
necessary to determine whether the lower standard applied because 
the states met the traditional standing test set forth in Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife.71 The court also concluded that the land trusts 
met the requirements of the Lujan test.72 
Applying the Lujan test, the court concluded that the states alleged 
present injuries, including declining water supplies caused by the 
reduced size of snowpack, which were similar to the coastal erosion 
that the Supreme Court held to be a sufficient injury for 
Massachusetts in Massachusetts v. EPA.73 The states also alleged a 
variety of future injuries, including increased illness and death, 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. at 333. The court stressed that, at the pleading stage, the court “presume[s] the general factual 
allegations embrace those facts necessary to support the [plaintiffs’] claim” and the court construes all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the plaintiffs’ allegations in their favor. Id. Consequently, the 
court noted that the plaintiffs in the case, at the pleading stage, did not need to present scientific 
evidence to prove their injury-in-fact, causation, or redressability. Id. The court stressed that a more 
stringent standard would apply at the summary judgment stage or at trial. Id. 
 68. Id. at 334. “[T]he States [we]re suing in both their proprietary and parens patriae 
capacit[y] . . . .” Id. “Parens patriae is an ancient common law prerogative which ‘is inherent in the 
supreme power of every state . . . [and is] often necessary to be exercised in the interests of humanity, 
and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.’” Id. (quoting Late Corp. of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890)). The states in the 
case were suing to protect their natural resources and the health of their citizens. Id. at 338.  
 69. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 338. The court indicated that, based on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1992), a state suing 
based on parens patriae “(1) ‘must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private 
parties . . .’; (2) ‘must express a quasi-sovereign interest’; and (3) must have ‘alleged injury to a 
sufficiently substantial segment of its population.’” Id. at 335–36 (footnote omitted).  
 70. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 335–36 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).  
 71. Id. at 338. Under Lujan, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered an injury-in fact that 
is caused by the defendant’s action and that the relief that the plaintiff seeks will redress his injury. 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).  
 72. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 349.  
 73. Id. at 341.  
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increased smog, beach erosion, accelerated sea level rise, salinization 
of marshes and water supplies, more droughts and floods, and 
increased wildfires.74 Although the land trusts did not allege present 
injuries, they did allege future harm to the ecological and aesthetic 
values of the lands they held in trust, which would interfere with their 
efforts to preserve ecologically significant and sensitive lands for 
scientific and educational purposes and for human use and 
enjoyment.75 Although many of the future harms that plaintiffs 
asserted would not occur in the short term, the court concluded that 
they were imminent because they were certain to occur.76 
Regarding causation, the defendants argued that global climate 
change is caused by many factors other than their emission of 
greenhouse gases, so plaintiffs could not prove that any specific harm 
was caused by their activities.77 The court rejected that argument, 
however, holding that (1) the causation analysis for purposes of 
standing, particularly at the pleading stage, is not the same as the 
proximate cause standard that applies to the merits of a tort action,78 
and (2) the plaintiffs satisfed the requirement that their injury be 
fairly traceable to the defendants’ conduct by alleging that the 
defendants’ activities contributed to their injuries.79  
Finally, regarding redressability, the court rejected the defendants’ 
argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the greenhouse 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. at 342.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 344 (quoting Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 42–43, Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 
(No. 05-5104cv). The court wrote, “In describing imminence, the [Supreme] Court was not imposing a 
strict temporal requirement that a future injury occur within a particular time period . . . . Instead, the 
Court focused on the certainty of that injury occurring in the future, seeking to ensure that the injury was 
not speculative.” Id. at 343. With regard to the future injuries of the states and land trusts, the court 
wrote, “[T]hey are certain to occur because of the consequences, based on the laws of physics and 
chemistry, of the documented increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.” Id. at 344. Although the 
plaintiffs also alleged standing because the defendants’ actions caused an increased risk of harm, the 
court did not find it necessary to determine whether that constituted an “injury-in-fact” because it 
concluded that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged other injuries. Id. at 344 n.21.  
 77. Id. at 345. The defendants alleged that the plaintiffs were required to prove that the defendants’ 
activities alone caused the plaintiffs’ harm. Id.  
 78. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 346. The court also pointed out that even on the merits, 
defendants who concurrently cause a plaintiffs’ indivisible injury can be held jointly and severally 
liable. Id.  
 79. Id. at 346–47.  
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gas emissions that the plaintiffs sought to limit through an injunction 
would not prevent the plaintiffs’ injuries, because global climate 
change is caused by the emissions of many other entities that were 
not parties to the lawsuit.80 Citing Massachusetts v. EPA, the court 
ruled that a demonstration that the courts could provide some 
measure of relief is sufficient to show redressability, and the 
proposed remedy does not need to address or prevent all of the 
plaintiffs’ harm.81 Accordingly, the court determined that the 
plaintiffs satisfied the redressability requirement for standing because 
even though the relief that the plaintiffs sought would not itself 
reverse global warming, it would slow the pace of emissions 
increases.82 
After the court concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, the 
court addressed another issue that was not resolved by the district 
court and held that the plaintiffs made sufficient allegations to state a 
claim for relief under the federal common law of nuisance.83 
Applying the Restatement formulation for a claim for public 
nuisance, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaints 
adequately alleged “an unreasonable interference” with a right 
common to the general public.84 The court had little trouble 
concluding that the states were suing to prevent harm to public rights 
in their jurisdictions, including “the right to public comfort and 
safety, the right to protection of vital natural resources and public 
property, and the right to use, enjoy, and preserve the aesthetic and 
ecological values of the natural world.”85 Although private parties 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. at 348. 
 81. Id. at 348–49. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 349–71. Like the standing issue, on appeal, the parties fully briefed the issue regarding the 
plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim. Id. at 349. Once again, since the court was considering a motion to 
dismiss based on the pleadings, it stressed that it would “constru[e] the complaint[s] liberally, accepting 
all factual allegations in the complaint[s] as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff[s’] 
favor.” Id. (alteration in original). The court wrote that “[c]ourts apply a ‘permissive’ standard in 
assessing public nuisance pleadings.” Id. at 370.  
 84. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 352–53. The Restatement definition of public nuisance is set 
forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1965).  
 85. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 352–53. The court also concluded that New York City had 
sufficiently alleged interference with rights common to the public within the city, including increased 
heat related deaths and damage to the city’s coastal infrastructure. Id. at 366.  
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must also demonstrate that they have suffered a harm that is different 
in kind to bring a public nuisance action,86 the court concluded that 
the land trusts adequately alleged such harm.87 
Finally, the court rejected the defendants’ claim that other federal 
laws displaced the plaintiffs’ federal common law public nuisance 
claims. The court stressed that federal common law is displaced when 
a federal statute speaks directly to the question otherwise addressed 
by federal common law.88 The defendants argued that the Clean Air 
Act established a comprehensive regulatory program to address air 
pollution similar to the Clean Water Act program addressing water 
pollution, which the Supreme Court, in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 
determined displaced federal common law for interstate water 
pollution.89 The Second Circuit disagreed, however, pointing out that 
while the Clean Air Act established a comprehensive program for 
regulating “criteria pollutants,” the Act did not currently target 
emissions of greenhouse gases from stationary sources, like power 
plants.90 The court also noted that while the Supreme Court, in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, recognized that the EPA could regulate 
carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles under the Clean Air 
Act, the agency is only beginning to focus on using that authority to 
regulate motor vehicle emissions and has not yet developed any 
proposed regulations to address greenhouse gas emissions from 
                                                                                                                 
 86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1965). 
 87. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 363. The court wrote that “although the Trusts are private 
entities, they share similar features with public entities due to the fact that their lands are open to the 
public and they are private property owners ‘whose charter, purpose and mission is to preserve land for 
public use, enjoyment, and benefit.’” Id. at 368–69. The court also suggested that “[t]he magnitude of 
the Trusts’ land ownership also constitutes such a difference in degree as to become a difference in 
kind.” Id. at 369. 
 88. Id. at 374. The court pointed out that “dueling preemptions” apply when analyzing statutes and 
their impact on the common law. Id. On the one hand, “separation of powers concerns create a 
presumption in favor of preemption of federal common law whenever it can be said that Congress has 
legislated on the subject.” At the same time, “[s]tatutes which invade the common law . . . are to be read 
with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a 
statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.” Id. at 374 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Oswego Barge Corp. (In re Oswego Barge Corp.), 664 F.2d 327, 335 (2d Cir. 
1981); United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)).  
 89. Id. at 378.  
 90. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 376, 380–81.  
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stationary sources.91 Consequently, the court determined that the 
Clean Air Act did not directly address the question otherwise 
addressed by the plaintiffs’ public nuisance action.92 Further, the 
court concluded that none of several other federal laws that required 
climate change studies or reports displaced the federal common law 
of public nuisance.93  
B.  Comer v. Murphy 
Only a month after the Second Circuit issued its opinion in 
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., a panel of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Comer v. Murphy, 
overturned a trial court’s order that dismissed private and public 
nuisance actions brought by residents and land owners on the 
Mississippi Gulf Coast against energy, fossil fuel, and chemical 
companies.94 In a diversity action, the plaintiffs sought money 
damages under state common law based on private and public 
nuisance, trespass, negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy, but not an injunction.95 
Regarding the nuisance claims, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants’ actions emitted greenhouse gases that caused an increase 
in global air and water temperatures and subsequently caused a rise in 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Id. at 378–79. The Massachusetts v. EPA court held that the EPA could regulate carbon dioxide 
emissions from motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act if it made an “endangerment” finding under the 
Act and then issued regulations after making that finding. Id. at 379. The Second Circuit noted that, at 
the time of its decision, the EPA had only made a proposed endangerment finding, so it had not issued 
any regulations to address carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles. Id. The court also stressed that 
while the EPA might be able to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases from stationary sources under 
other provisions of the Clean Air Act if it made endangerment findings under those provisions and 
issued regulations, the agency has not done that. Id. The court held that the Clean Air Act scheme for 
regulating greenhouse gas emissions more closely regulated the program that was in place under the 
Clean Water Act at the time that the Supreme Court held that the Clean Water Act did not displace 
federal common law in Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I) than the Clean Water Act program that was 
in place at the time that the Court decided City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II). Id. at 379–80. 
 92. Id. at 381.  
 93. Id. at 387. The court wrote, “Congress has prescribed research, reports, technology development, 
and monitoring, but . . . has not enacted any legislation that ‘addresses’ the problem that climate change 
presents to Plaintiffs. . . . The linchpin in the displacement analysis concerns whether the legislation 
actually regulates the nuisance at issue. Study is not enough.” Id. at 385–86.  
 94. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated, reh’g granted en banc, 598 
F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010); appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 95. Id. at 859–60. 
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sea levels that added to the strength of Hurricane Katrina, which 
destroyed the plaintiffs’ private property, as well as public property.96 
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds that 
the plaintiffs lacked standing and the claims presented nonjusticiable 
political questions.97  
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit panel held that the plaintiffs had 
standing to bring the public and private nuisance, trespass, and 
negligence claims, and none of those claims presented non-justiciable 
political questions.98 Regarding standing, since the appellate court 
was reviewing the trial court’s decision to dismiss the claim based on 
the pleadings, as was the case with Connecticut v. American Electric 
Power Co., the court noted that general factual allegations of injury 
may be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.99 The court 
restated the traditional Article III test for standing: a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that (1) they have suffered an injury in fact, (2) the 
injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s action, and (3) the injury 
will likely be redressed by a favorable decision from the court.100 The 
defendants did not contest that the plaintiffs met the first and third 
standing requirements, injury in fact and redressability, so the court 
focused its analysis primarily on the second factor, causation.101  
While the defendants argued that the chain of causation between 
their emission of greenhouses gases and the plaintiffs’ injuries from 
Hurricane Katrina was too attenuated, the court stressed that the 
connection for standing purposes “need not be as close as the 
proximate causation needed to succeed on the merits of a tort claim” 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Id. at 861. 
 97. Id. at 860. 
 98. Id. The court dismissed the unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy 
claims for prudential standing reasons. Id. For those claims, the plaintiffs were not alleging that the 
defendants’ greenhouse gas emissions caused their injuries, but were alleging that the defendants’ public 
relations campaigns and pricing of petrochemicals caused their injuries. Id. at 860–61.  
 99. Id. at 862. As a preliminary matter, the court pointed out that the plaintiffs were required to meet 
both state and federal standing requirements, since the case was a federal diversity case involving state 
common law. Id. at 861. The court noted, however, that the plaintiffs easily satisfied the liberal standing 
requirements of Mississippi law, which mandate that plaintiffs must “assert a colorable interest in the 
subject matter of the litigation or experience an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant.” Id. at 
862. 
 100. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 862 (5th Cir. 2009).  
 101. Id. at 863–64.  
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and an indirect causal relationship is sufficient for standing as long as 
there is a fairly traceable connection between the defendant’s 
conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.102 The court also counseled that the 
defendants’ argument regarding attenuation was the same argument 
that the Supreme Court rejected in Massachusetts v. EPA.103 In fact, 
the court suggested that the connection in Massachusetts v. EPA was 
even more attenuated than the connection in the case at bar, because 
the Massachusetts plaintiffs were challenging the EPA’s decision to 
not regulate greenhouse gas emissions, which led to an increase in 
greenhouse gas emissions, whereas the Comer plaintiffs were 
challenging the increased greenhouse gas emissions by the 
defendants.104  
The Fifth Circuit panel also rejected the defendants’ argument that 
the plaintiffs lacked standing. The defendant’s argued that they were 
not the sole or material cause of the plaintiffs’ injury because their 
actions only contributed to the plaintiffs’ injury and global climate 
change is caused by a wide variety of sources.105 Once again, the 
court suggested that the defendants’ claim was similar to a claim 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA.106 The 
Comer court wrote that “to satisfy the ‘fairly traceable’ element of 
standing plaintiffs need not ‘show to a scientific certainty that 
defendant’s [pollutants], and defendant’s [pollutants] alone, caused 
the precise harm suffered by the plaintiffs . . . but rather whether ‘the 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Id. at 864 (quoting Toll Bros. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2009)). In a 
concurring opinion, Judge Davis wrote that the plaintiffs’ claim would probably not meet the proximate 
cause standard required on the merits, but he noted that the court was not required to reach that question 
on appeal. Id. at 880 (Davis, J., concurring). While the majority stressed that a different standard applies 
to causation for purposes of standing than the proximate cause standard that applies on the merits of the 
tort claim, the majority also stressed that it was applying a more lenient standard than it would at a later 
stage of the litigation because it was reviewing a motion to dismiss based on the pleadings. Id. at 864–65 
(majority opinion).  
 103. Id. at 865. The court noted that the Massachusetts v. EPA court “accepted as plausible the link 
between man-made greenhouse gas emissions and global warming, as well as the nexus of warmer 
climate and rising ocean temperatures with the strength of hurricanes.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 104. Id. The court recognized that the Massachusetts v. EPA court offered “special solicitude” to the 
plaintiffs in that case because they were states, but the Comer court noted that “the chain of causation at 
issue here is one step shorter than the one recognized in Massachusetts, so these plaintiffs need no 
special solicitude.” Id. at 865–66 n.5.  
 105. Id. at 866–67.  
 106. Comer, 585 F.3d at 866. 
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pollutant causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged by the 
plaintiffs.’”107 Since it concluded that the defendants’ actions 
contributed to the plaintiffs’ injuries, the court determined that the 
traceability requirement for standing was met.108 
Regarding the defendants’ claim that the plaintiffs’ claims 
presented non-justiciable political questions, the Fifth Circuit panel 
noted that the political question doctrine does not preclude a court 
from reviewing disputes merely because they have political 
implications or ramifications.109 Instead, the doctrine precludes 
review of such questions if they are “political” in the sense that they 
have been committed by the Constitution exclusively to the elected or 
political branches.110 While the court recognized that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Baker v. Carr normally provides the framework 
for analyzing whether a claim is a non-justiciable political question, it 
held that a challenger has the burden of identifying a constitutional 
provision or federal law that commits the issue in the case 
exclusively to a political branch.111 Since the defendants in the case 
did not identify any constitutional provision or federal law that 
committed the issues in the case to the political branches, the court 
did not apply the Baker test.112 The court also suggested that 
“[c]ommon-law tort claims are rarely thought to present 
nonjusticiable political questions . . . [because] ‘the common law of 
tort provides clear and well-settled rules on which the district court 
can easily rely.’”113 The court also stressed that “claims for damages 
are . . . considerably less likely to present nonjusticiable political 
questions, compared with claims for injunctive relief.”114  
The Fifth Circuit panel ultimately concluded that “the questions 
posed by this case, viz., whether defendants are liable to plaintiffs in 
damages under Mississippi’s common law torts of nuisance, trespass 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Id. (first and second alteration in original). 
 108. Id. at 866–68.  
 109. Id. at 870.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 872.  
 112. Comer, 585 F.3d at 875.  
 113. Id. at 873 (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991)).  
 114. Id. at 874.  
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or negligence, are justiciable because they plainly have not been 
committed by the Constitution or federal laws or regulations to 
Congress or the president.”115  
Although the Fifth Circuit panel’s decision in Comer seemed to 
brighten prospects for an expansion of public nuisance actions to 
address broad environmental problems, the Fifth Circuit vacated the 
decision in March 2010, when it agreed to rehear the appeal en 
banc.116 
C.  California v. General Motors Corp. 
Just as plaintiffs in global warming nuisance actions initially were 
thwarted at the district court level in the Second and Fifth Circuits, 
they have met little success at the district court level in the Ninth 
Circuit. In California v. General Motors Corp., the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed a 
nuisance action brought by the State of California against General 
Motors, Toyota, Ford, Honda, Chrysler, and Nissan on the grounds 
that the case raised non-justiciable political questions.117  
The State of California sued the automakers based on federal and 
state common law, alleging that the greenhouse gases emitted by the 
vehicles the defendants manufactured constituted a public 
nuisance.118 The State sought money damages and a declaratory 
judgment for future money damages but did not seek an injunction.119 
In its complaint, the State alleged that the defendants produced 
vehicles that emitted more than 20% of the carbon dioxide emissions 
generated by human activity in the United States. Furthermore, the 
State claimed the emissions contribute to global warming that has 
caused increased average winter temperatures in California, reduced 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Id. at 870.  
 116. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2010). The court subsequently dismissed 
the appeal when it lost a quorum. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010).  
 117. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *10–11 
(N.D. Sept. 17, Cal. 2007).  
 118. Id. at *3–5.  
 119. Id. at *4. Some commentators have suggested that a public nuisance action for damages may be 
more likely to withstand a non-justiciability challenge than a claim for injunctive relief. See infra note 
210. 
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snow pack, increased flooding, increased erosion, increased 
frequency and duration of extreme heat events, and increased 
intensity and risk of wildfires.120 The automakers filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaint based on non-justiciability, failure to state a 
claim under California common law or federal common law, and 
preemption.121  
The court analyzed the plaintiff’s complaint under the Baker v. 
Carr analysis for justiciability and indicated that, based on the third 
factor, the court could not decide the case “without making an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.”122 
Even though the State of California sought money damages rather 
than an injunction, the court concluded that it would still need to 
balance the harm caused by the emissions from the defendants’ 
vehicles against the economic effects of limits on the emissions to 
determine whether the defendants’ conduct was an “unreasonable” 
interference with a public right, as required for a public nuisance 
action.123 The district court further concluded that the deliberate 
inaction of the political and executive branches indicated that the 
other branches are still actively considering the issue.124 The court 
felt that an award of money damages could undermine the strategic 
choices of the other branches regarding appropriate action to address 
global climate change.125  
After determining that the plaintiff’s claim was non-justiciable, the 
court concluded that it was not necessary to determine whether the 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *3–4.  
 121. Id. at *5. 
 122. Id. at *19, 38.  
 123. Id. at *22–24. 
 124. Id. at *30.  
 125. Id. at *29. The court wrote that “[b]ecause a comprehensive global warming solution must be 
achieved by a broad array of domestic and international measures that are yet undefined, it would be 
premature and inappropriate for this Court to wade into this type of policy-making determination before 
the elected branches have done so.” Id. at *30. The court also concluded that under the first Baker factor 
the issues in the case were textually committed to the political branches because the claims implicate the 
power of Congress and the Executive Branch over interstate commerce and foreign policy. Id. at *43. 
Finally, under the second Baker factor, the court determined that there were no judicially discoverable or 
manageable standards to govern resolution of the plaintiffs’ claims. Id. The court distinguished the case 
from other public nuisance cases because the other cases did not raise similar national and international 
policy issues. Id. at *46.  
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plaintiff stated a claim under federal common law, whether federal 
statutes displaced common law, and whether the plaintiff stated a 
claim under state common law.126  
Although the State of California initially appealed the court’s 
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
the State subsequently moved to dismiss its appeal when the EPA 
took the first steps toward regulating greenhouse gas emissions from 
motor vehicles, the President directed the Department of 
Transportation to establish higher fuel efficiency standards, and 
Chrysler and General Motors filed for bankruptcy.127  
D.  Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.  
The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California dismissed another nuisance action tied to global climate 
change in Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.128 In that case, the city of 
Kivalina, Alaska, and the governing body of an Inupiat village sued 
several dozen oil, energy, and utility companies. The plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendants’ greenhouse gas emissions contributed to 
global climate change, which has diminished the Arctic ice, resulting 
in erosion and destruction that will require the city and village of 
Kivalina to relocate.129 The plaintiffs based their claims on federal 
public nuisance law, state public and private nuisance law, and state 
claims for conspiracy and concert of action.130 They sought money 
damages, rather than an injunction, alleging that the relocation of the 
city could cost as much as $400 million.131  
The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims on the 
grounds that they were non-justiciable and the plaintiffs lacked 
standing to sue.132 Unlike the panel in the General Motors Corp. 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *50.  
 127. See Kevin P. Holewinski & Kristin L. Parker, California Attorney General Dismisses Appeal of 
Climate Change Suit Against Automakers, MARTINDALE, July 14, 2009, 
http://www.martindale.com/environmental-law/article_Jones-Day_750198.htm.  
 128. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).  
 129. Id. at 868–69.  
 130. Id. at 869. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. at 870.  
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case, the Kivalina panel determined that the plaintiffs’ claims did not 
run afoul of the first Baker factor, in that the issue in the case was not 
textually committed to another branch.133 However, the panel 
concluded, under the second and third Baker factors, that the court 
lacked judicially discoverable and manageable factors to decide the 
case and the issue required an initial policy determination by the 
legislative or executive branch.134 Like the California panel, the 
Kivalina panel concluded that the court could not balance the gravity 
of the harm caused by the defendants’ actions against the utility of 
the conduct to determine whether the conduct was “unreasonable” as 
required for a nuisance action without additional standards.135 
After finding the plaintiffs’ claims non-justiciable, the court also 
determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.136 The court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that they only needed to demonstrate 
that the defendants contributed to their injury in order to establish 
standing at the early stages of litigation.137 Contrary to the approach 
taken by the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fifth 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Id. at 873. The panel stressed that “a mandate to regulate a certain area is not the equivalent of 
delegating the exclusive power to resolve that issue to another branch,” and “the mere fact that foreign 
affairs have been affected by a judicial decision does not implicate abstention.” Id. at 872–73 (quoting 
Khouzam v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 549 F.3d 235, 250 (3d Cir. 2008)).  
 134. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 873–77. 
 135. Id. at 874–75. The panel argued: 
[T]he factfinder will have to weigh . . . the energy-producing alternatives that were 
available in the past and consider their respective impact on far ranging issues such as 
their reliability as an energy source, safety considerations and the impact of different 
alternatives on consumers and business at every level. The factfinder would then have to 
weigh the benefits derived from those choices against the risk that increasing greenhouse 
gases would in turn increase the risk of causing flooding along the coast of a remote 
Alaskan locale. 
Id. (citations omitted). The court held that the precedent nuisance cases did not provide sufficient 
guidance to determine whether the defendants’ actions were unreasonable. Id. Finally, the court held that 
the political branches should resolve the dispute because 
virtually everyone on Earth is responsible on some level for contributing to such 
emissions. Yet [p]laintiffs are in effect asking this Court to make a political judgment that 
the two dozen defendants named in this action should be the only ones to bear the cost of 
contributing to global warming. 
Id. at 877 (footnote omitted). The court, instead, felt that “the allocation of fault—and cost—of global 
warming is a matter appropriately left for determination by the executive or legislative branch in the first 
instance.” Id.  
 136. Id. at 882.  
 137. Id. at 878–80. The court recognized, though, that the causation requirement for standing is less 
than “proximate causation.” Id. at 878. 
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Circuits, the district court panel in Kivalina suggested that plaintiffs 
must allege that the defendants’ conduct was the “seed of [their] 
injury” and the plaintiffs’ claim must fail if the defendants can 
identify alternative sources of the plaintiffs’ injury.138 Since global 
climate change is caused by a variety of different sources, the panel 
concluded that the plaintiffs were not able to demonstrate that the 
defendants’ actions caused their injuries.139 Since the court dismissed 
the federal claims, they also dismissed the state common law 
claims.140 The plaintiffs have appealed the decision to the Ninth 
Circuit.141 
E.  Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. 
Although the federal district courts in the Ninth Circuit have not 
been receptive to plaintiffs’ common law actions for harm caused by 
global climate change and related disasters, plaintiffs have had more 
luck in the district courts in the Fifth Circuit. In Barasich v. Columbia 
Gulf Transmission Co., the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana rejected the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss the lawsuit, which was brought by thousands of residents of 
Louisiana against oil and gas companies for the damages caused by 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, on the grounds that the suit raised non-
justiciable political questions.142  
The plaintiffs sued the defendants based on negligence, among 
other grounds, alleging that the construction of canals and destruction 
of wetlands by the defendants reduced the natural buffer that the 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Id. at 880–81 (alteration in original). 
 139. Id. The plaintiffs also claimed that they were entitled to special solicitude in the standing analysis 
under Massachusetts v. EPA because they were sovereign. Id. at 882. The court distinguished that case, 
however, on the grounds that they were not seeking to enforce a procedural right and were not states, 
like the plaintiffs in Massachusetts v. EPA. Id. 
 140. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 882. The court pointed out, “A district court may decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if it has dismissed all claims over which it had original 
jurisdiction.” Id. 
 141. See Rachel D’Oro, Kivalina, Alaska: Eroding Village Appeals Lawsuit’s Dismissal, Blames 
Corporations for Climate Change, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 21, 2010, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/29/kivalina-appeals-eroding-_n_441420.html. 
 142. Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. La. 2006). While the 
case began as two class action lawsuits brought by nine plaintiffs, the plaintiffs filed a joint amended 
complaint to sue on behalf of thousands of residents in seventeen different parishes. Id. at 678–79.  
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wetlands provided to the residents’ property, thus increasing the 
damage caused to their property by the hurricanes.143 The actions 
were based on state law, and the plaintiffs sought money damages 
rather than an injunction.144 In response to the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss, the court applied the Baker factors and held that the case was 
“nothing more than a tort suit under Louisiana law.”145 The court 
noted that the Fifth Circuit had previously suggested that cases 
seeking money damages, like Barasich, were less likely to be non-
justiciable than cases seeking injunctive relief, which could require 
courts to dictate policy to federal agencies.146 The court also held that 
federal water pollution laws did not preempt state common law 
actions like those at bar.147  
However, the Barasich court’s decision also demonstrates some of 
the remaining impediments to reliance on common law actions on a 
broader scale. Although the court concluded that the case did not 
raise non-justiciable political questions, the court ultimately granted 
the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.148 Even though the 
court applied a favorable standard of review to the plaintiffs’ 
complaint on the motion to dismiss based on the pleadings,149 the 
court concluded that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that any 
particular defendant caused their injuries for their negligence 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Id. at 678–80. The plaintiffs alleged that over a million acres of wetlands were destroyed by the 
defendants’ activities and millions more were degraded. Id. at 679. The defendants’ activities caused 
salt-water intrusion into the wetlands, which destroys the wetlands vegetation, converting them to open 
water. Id. The plaintiffs sued for negligence, based on Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code, as well 
as strict liability, based on Article 667 of the Code. Id. at 679–80.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 684. The defendants argued that the case required an initial policy determination by the 
political branches because it implicated energy policy, economic development, and environmental 
protection, and the balance between those interests. Id. at 686. However, the court concluded that an 
initial policy determination is unnecessary when there are judicially manageable standards to apply. Id. 
at 686–87.  
 146. Id. at 685–86. 
 147. Id. at 688.  
 148. Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 695. 
 149. The court accepted all facts in the pleadings as true and interpreted the facts in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiffs, the non-moving party. Id. at 680. 
28
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 3
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss3/3
2011] COMMON LAW REMEDIES  
 
593
claim.150 While a plaintiff could make out its prima facie case for 
negligence by demonstrating that a defendant’s actions were a 
concurrent cause of the plaintiffs’ harm and were also a substantial 
factor in contributing to that harm, the plaintiffs did not allege that 
their injuries were caused by any particular defendant.151 The court 
counseled, “The plaintiffs cannot impose liability on a defendant 
absent a showing of individual causation. The Fifth Circuit has 
repeatedly rejected theories of group liability or market share 
liability.”152  
Although the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, the court 
instructed the plaintiffs on a future course of action that might be 
more fruitful. The court wrote: 
By all accounts, coastal erosion is a serious problem in south 
Louisiana. If plaintiffs are right about the defendants’ 
contribution to this development, perhaps a more focused, less 
ambitious lawsuit between parties who are proximate in time and 
space, with a less attenuated connection between the defendant’s 
conduct and the plaintiff’s loss, would be the way to test their 
theory.153 
F.  In Re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation  
The final significant district court decision involving common law 
claims relating to global climate change or natural disasters was In re 
Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation.154 In that case, 
several residents of New Orleans sued the United States for damages 
they suffered in light of the failure of levees during Hurricane 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Id. at 691. The court also determined that the defendants did not owe a duty to the plaintiffs to 
protect them from damages caused by hurricanes because the harm was too attenuated. Id. at 693. For 
the strict liability claim that was based on Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code, the court determined 
that the statute only imposed strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities on “neighbors” of the plaintiffs 
and that the defendants were not “neighbors” under the statute. Id. at 690. 
 151. Id. at 694–95. 
 152. Id. at 694.  
 153. Id. at 695.  
 154. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644 (E.D. La. 2007).  
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Katrina.155 The plaintiffs brought an action for money damages under 
state law, alleging that the Army Corps of Engineers was negligent in 
constructing and maintaining the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, a 
channel from New Orleans to the Gulf of Mexico, and that its 
negligence caused increased velocity of water in the channel during 
Hurricane Katrina, which led to the destruction of the levees that 
caused the harm to the plaintiffs’ properties.156 The plaintiffs alleged 
that the Corps was aware that “wave wash” caused when large 
vessels navigated the channel would widen the channel and erode the 
berms protecting the levees in the vicinity of the channel and that 
some of the levees would incrementally lower over time due to lateral 
displacement of soil.157 The plaintiffs also alleged that the Corps’ 
dredging in the channel caused salt-water intrusion that destroyed 
wetlands and increased wave force in the channel.158 
Unlike many of the other cases described above, the defendant did 
not argue that the claims were non-justiciable, and they did not argue 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The case is significant, however, 
because the court concluded that the defendant’s actions, over a 
course of several decades, caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.159 Even 
though the defendant’s actions were combined with the much more 
destructive force of Hurricane Katrina, the court concluded that the 
defendant’s actions were concurring causes of the plaintiffs’ injuries, 
so the defendant could be held liable.160  
IV.  BEYOND CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISASTER: NEW AVENUES FOR 
THE COMMON LAW 
Although the recent mini-renaissance in common law 
environmental protection lawsuits has focused on global climate 
                                                                                                                 
 155. Id. at 647–48.  
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 653–79.  
 158. Id. at 665–75. 
 159. Id. at 697–98. 
 160. In re Katrina, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 697–98. The Corps argued that the plaintiffs’ injuries were 
caused by the “shear force of Hurricane Katrina and its resultant storm surge,” rather than a combination 
of the two. Id. at 681.  
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change and disasters, it could reinvigorate the use of the common law 
to address several other problems that are not being adequately 
addressed by federal or state public law. While it may still be unclear 
in some cases whether the common law actions would be based on a 
federal common law or state common law, the federal environmental 
statutes will generally preserve common law remedies.161  
Several of the global climate change lawsuits were public nuisance 
actions, but for many of the issues that are not being adequately 
addressed by federal or state regulators, private nuisance actions may 
be more appropriate. This is particularly true when the harms caused 
by individual defendants are localized and the plaintiff has already 
suffered harm. Advances in science, coupled with data collected 
under the public laws, can make it easier for plaintiffs to prove that 
the defendants’ actions constitute a nuisance.  
Private nuisance actions might be especially useful to target harms 
caused to isolated waters, non-navigable tributaries of navigable 
waters, and other waters that the federal government has ceased to 
regulate in light of recent Supreme Court decisions.162 Such waters 
often provide valuable benefits to adjacent landowners, including 
flood prevention, pollution control, erosion prevention, and 
groundwater recharge.163 As Professor J.B. Ruhl observes, since 
experts have begun to assign dollar figures to these “ecosystem 
services,” it should be easier to demonstrate that the destruction of 
the ecosystems is an “ecological nuisance.”164 Professor Ruhl 
recognizes that it may be more difficult for a plaintiff to prevail in a 
nuisance action when the plaintiff’s property is physically remote 
from the defendant, the plaintiff’s harm occurs a considerable time 
after the defendant has acted, or there are many persons who are 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(e), 1370 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6929, 6972(f) (2006); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9614 (2006). 
 162. See Murphy & Johnson, supra note 34, at 455–56 (discussing the narrowing of Clean Water Act 
jurisdiction in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos).  
 163. See Robin Kundis Craig, Justice Kennedy and Ecosystem Services: A Functional Approach to 
Clean Water Act Jurisdiction After Rapanos, 38 ENVTL. L. 635, 641–43 (2008).  
 164. See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 758–61, 784.  
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acting to harm the waters.165 He also recognizes that it may be 
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in such suits when they have not yet 
suffered any harm, but are suing based on anticipated harm.166 
Nevertheless, he observes that when plaintiffs can identify and 
quantify specific harms caused by destruction or degradation of 
ecosystems, such lawsuits appear “rather plain vanilla as far as 
nuisance doctrine is concerned.”167  
Professor John Nagle cites Cook v. Sullivan,168 a recent New 
Hampshire Supreme Court decision, as an example of the “ecological 
nuisance” actions envisioned by Professor Ruhl.169 In Cook, the 
plaintiffs sued their neighbor when the neighbor built his house in 
wetlands, which altered the hydrology of the area and increased 
flooding on the plaintiffs’ property.170 The supreme court agreed that 
the defendants’ activities constituted a nuisance and upheld the lower 
court’s order that required the defendant to move the house out of the 
wetlands.171  
                                                                                                                 
 165. Id. at 764–70. Professor Ruhl notes that it might be difficult, depending on the facts of the cases, 
to demonstrate in some of those cases that the defendants intentionally caused an interference with the 
plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of their property. Id. For purposes of nuisance law, a defendant acts 
intentionally when they either act for the purpose of causing the interference with the plaintiff’s property 
rights or when they know with substantial certainty that they will cause that interference. Id. 
 166. Id. at 763–64. Professor Ruhl indicates that the extent of the harm that the defendant’s actions 
will cause will often be unclear until the defendant acts. Id.  
 167. Id. at 773. In order to prove that a defendant’s action constitutes a nuisance, a plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant’s action constitutes an “unreasonable” invasion of the plaintiff’s property 
rights, which requires a balancing of the gravity of the harm against the utility of the defendant’s 
conduct. Id. at 772. Regarding the gravity of the harm, Professor Ruhl argues: 
There is nothing about [that analysis] that puts ecosystem service nuisances in some 
qualitatively distinct category compared to other nuisances. [Because t]he injuries 
associated with loss of ecosystem services can be severe, they are often manifested in 
physical damage to tangible property, and they can pose risks to residences and socially 
valuable commercial and agricultural operations that are perfectly suited to their 
localities. 
Id. He also notes that, regarding the “utility of [the] defendant’s conduct,” as the economic benefits of 
ecosystem services are quantified, it is less likely that destruction of ecosystems for development 
purposes will outweigh those benefits. Id. at 773. While “many acres of coastal dunes, wetlands, and 
forests have given way to development of one kind or another,” Ruhl points out that “[n]ow that we 
know how economically devastating the loss of natural capital can be locally and regionally, the fact that 
it was once seen as acceptable ought to play a significantly diminished role on defendants’ behalf.” Id.  
 168. Cook v. Sullivan, 829 A.2d 1059 (N.H. 2003). 
 169. See John Copeland Nagle, From Swamp Drainage to Wetlands Regulation to Ecological 
Nuisances to Environmental Ethics, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 787, 797–99 (2008).  
 170. Cook, 829 A.2d at 1062.  
 171. Id. at 1067–68.  
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Similar “ecological nuisance” actions could be brought to address 
harms caused by non-point source pollution, destruction of 
ecosystems that provide habitat for endangered or threatened species, 
or harms related to practices involved in growing genetically 
modified crops. In each of these areas, either the federal laws do not 
provide for a comprehensive federal role or the federal government 
has not aggressively used authorities under the laws to address the 
issues. 
Private nuisance actions might also be used more aggressively to 
address the problems caused by non-hazardous solid waste 
management, another issue not addressed comprehensively by federal 
public law. Pollution data gathered under the Federal Emergency 
Planning and Community Right to Know Act, as well as data 
gathered by federal agencies under other environmental statutes 
regarding the harmful effects of various pollutants, should make it 
easier for plaintiffs to prevail in nuisance actions for harms caused by 
non-hazardous solid waste management.172 
Public nuisance actions could also be brought to address many of 
these problems when the harm caused by the defendants’ actions is 
more widespread. In addition, public nuisance law might be used to 
address current problems other than those identified above and global 
climate change. For instance, as industries expand the use of 
nanotechnology or expand the use of new or existing toxic 
substances, public nuisance actions might become attractive if federal 
regulation in those areas remains lax or non-existent and scientific 
studies can demonstrate that the substances cause specified harms. 
Even more creative applications of public nuisance law may be on 
the horizon. Professor Christine Klein, for instance, recently explored 
                                                                                                                 
 172. 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2006). The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act 
requires thousands of businesses to file annual reports with the EPA that describe the volume of various 
chemicals and pollutants that they use or discharge into the air, water, or land each year. Id. That 
information is included in a “Toxic Release Inventory” that is available on the web. U.S. EPA, TRI Data 
and Tools, http://www.epa.gov/tri/tridata/index.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). Information regarding 
the harmful effects of hazardous substances is available through the website of the Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), among other places. See ATSDR, Toxic Substances Portal, 
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/substances/index.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).  
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the potential for using nuisance law to address urban sprawl, another 
issue that has been largely ignored by public law.173  
The benefits of addressing the environmental problems identified 
above through common law actions are obvious and significant, if 
such suits can be successfully brought. Several of the features of 
common law that were criticized when compared to public law may 
actually be advantages of common law when compared to a non-
existent public law or non-enforced public law. Although common 
law is often criticized as slow,174 a slow process is preferable to 
inaction under public law. In addition, to the extent that plaintiffs can 
identify specific harms caused by activities that are unregulated or 
under-regulated under public law, a local decision-maker examining 
those concrete facts is probably in the best position to devise a 
remedy to address the environmental problem.175 Further, when the 
claims are brought in federal court or in state courts where the judges 
are not elected, the decision-maker is less subject to political 
pressure.  
The flexibility of remedies under common law is another 
advantage.176 If public laws addressed the problems outlined above, 
plaintiffs would normally be able to pursue injunctive or declaratory 
relief and, perhaps, civil penalties.177 The civil penalties, however, 
would be paid to the state or federal treasury, and the plaintiffs would 
                                                                                                                 
 173. See Christine A. Klein, The New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and Global 
Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155, 1213–16 (2007). Professor Klein views sprawl as an important 
environmental justice issue, since the benefits of sprawl are felt by one group, while the costs of sprawl 
are imposed on a very different group. Id. at 1213. As she suggests, sprawl can “contribute to the 
abandonment of urban communities, undercut economic productivity, deny equal opportunity, 
destabilize older suburbs, undercut education investments, reduce public safety, and worsen traffic 
congestion.” Id. at 1215. While arguing for the application of nuisance law to the problems caused by 
sprawl, she recognizes that it may be difficult to demonstrate causation or to prove a sufficient injury for 
standing when bringing a nuisance action against a sprawling developer. Id. at 1219.  
 174. Klass, supra note 3, at 583. 
 175. See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 778.  
 176. For instance, Professor Jonathan Zasloff has suggested that the public nuisance lawsuits brought 
by the states against energy producers and auto manufacturers are, in essence, a judicially created tax on 
greenhouse gas emissions. See Zasloff, supra note 17. In a separate article, Professor Jason Czarnezki 
suggests that courts could use their equitable powers at common law to create a common law fund to 
address pollution problems as a remedy in common law actions. See Czarnezki & Thomsen, supra note 
23, at 30–33.  
 177. See supra note 2.  
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not be able to recover money damages.178 Through common law 
actions, on the other hand, the plaintiffs can recover money damages. 
Thus, there is some assurance that the money the defendants pay will 
be used to address the problems caused by the defendants’ actions. 
Conversely, civil penalties under public law may have a deterrent 
effect but are not designed to compensate the plaintiffs.  
Common law actions might also address environmental justice 
issues not adequately addressed under public law. For instance, under 
public law, a developer might be granted a permit to destroy wetlands 
that provide flood protection and pollution control for one 
community because it has agreed to buy “mitigation credits” for 
protecting wetlands that provide benefits to a different community.179 
While the public law would transfer those ecosystem service benefits 
from one community to another, a court, under nuisance law, could 
order the developer to compensate the adversely impacted 
community for those losses. Similarly, while federal and state 
pollution permitting laws and pollution trading laws may lead to “hot 
spots,” geographic areas that are subjected to greater levels of 
pollution than other communities, common law actions could provide 
those communities with relief for those harms or a tool to prevent 
further harms.180 Common law courts are generally in the best 
position to address those concerns because they are likely to be 
familiar with the local conditions that created the problems and have 
broad experience balancing equitable factors to design remedies.  
On top of all the other benefits of common law actions, perhaps the 
greatest advantage of addressing global climate change, destruction 
or degradation of ecosystem services, and the other problems outlined 
above through the common law is that such actions can spur the 
federal and state governments to adopt stronger public laws to 
address those problems or to place greater emphasis on enforcing the 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Id.  
 179. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 607, 648–67 (2000).  
 180. See Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity II: The European Experience, 58 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 417, 441–42 (2001); Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental 
Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 129–30 (1999).  
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existing public laws.181 While the mere fact that common law actions 
are being brought may put pressure on legislatures and governments 
to expand and strengthen public law, common law actions can also 
provide valuable information about the environmental problems 
addressed in those actions that can be used to shape the expanded and 
strengthened public law.182 The United States Code is replete with 
legislative provisions that were motivated by litigation.183 As noted 
above, while public law may shape the development of common law 
actions, developments in the common law can also shape the public 
law.  
V.  NOT SO FAST: LIMITATIONS ON THE COMMON LAW RESPONSE 
Although the judicial opinions discussed above may spur renewed 
focus on the use of common law to address environmental problems, 
the importance of the decisions should not be exaggerated. Serious 
roadblocks remain on the path towards using common law actions to 
address broader environmental problems.  
A.  Causation  
Most importantly, while the decisions may ease a plaintiff’s burden 
of proving causation for standing, they do not ease the plaintiff’s 
burden of proving causation on the merits of the common law claim, 
regardless of whether the claim is a claim for nuisance, negligence, or 
strict liability. Several of the opinions stressed that causation for 
purposes of standing is not the same as the proximate causation that 
                                                                                                                 
 181. See Klein, supra note 173, at 1233; Zasloff, supra note 17, at 1827. However, Professor 
Madeline Klass notes that robust pursuit of common law actions might also spur legislation that protects 
industries. See Klass, supra note 29, at 1504. She points out that Congress often provides a federal 
remedy when displacing state law, but has enacted several laws over the last two decades that displace 
state law without providing a federal remedy in their place. Id. at 1538–42. None of those laws 
addressed environmental problems, though.  
 182. See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 778–82.  
 183. See generally Oliver A. Houck, The Water, the Trees, and the Land: Three Nearly Forgotten 
Cases that Changed the American Landscape, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2279 (1995); George Cameron Coggins 
& Doris K. Nagel, “Nothing Beside Remains”: The Legal Legacy of James G. Watt’s Tenure as 
Secretary of the Interior on Federal Land Law and Policy, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 473 (1990).  
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would need to be proved for the underlying claims.184 Frequently, one 
of the biggest roadblocks for plaintiffs in nuisance and negligence 
actions is demonstrating that the defendant’s actions proximately 
caused the plaintiff’s injuries. In fact, while the Barasich court held 
that the plaintiffs’ common law claims were justiciable, it dismissed 
their underlying claims and counseled the plaintiffs to test their 
theory in a “more focused, less ambitious lawsuit between parties 
who are proximate in time and space, with a less attenuated 
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s 
loss.”185 Similarly, Judge Davis, concurring in the Comer case, would 
have concluded that the plaintiffs in that case failed to state a claim 
on the merits.186 Thus, while the recent decisions might make it easier 
for the plaintiffs to proceed with their common law actions, they 
won’t make it easier for them to prevail on the merits.  
There are several reasons why causation may continue to be a 
stumbling block for plaintiffs that are trying to use common law 
actions to address broader environmental problems. First, although 
plaintiffs would prefer to use common law actions to prevent harm 
before it occurs, it will be much harder to prove that the defendant’s 
actions will cause specific harms to the plaintiffs when the harms 
have not yet occurred.187 Since it will be easier to prove causation 
when the harm has already occurred, it may be more appropriate to 
rely on those actions to redress ongoing harms than to prevent 
broader environmental problems.  
Another problem that plaintiffs face regardless of whether their 
lawsuit is based on past or future harm is that they must demonstrate 
that the defendants conduct was a “but for” cause of their harm, as 
well as the proximate cause.188 While it may be sufficient for 
standing purposes for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s 
actions “contribute to” the plaintiff’s injury, more will be required on 
                                                                                                                 
 184. See supra notes 78, 102, 137 and accompanying text.  
 185. Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 695 (E.D. La. 2006).  
 186. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated, reh’g granted en banc, 598 
F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010); appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 187. See Zasloff, supra note 17, at 1867–70.  
 188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430–39 (1965).  
37
Johnson: From Climate Change and Hurricanes to Ecological Nuisances: Commo
Published by Reading Room, 2011
 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:3 
 
602
the merits. When several defendants concurrently cause a plaintiff’s 
injury, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s actions were a 
“substantial factor” in causing the plaintiff’s harm in order to hold a 
defendant liable.189 Traditionally, in tort, plaintiffs have been 
required to demonstrate that the particular defendant who they are 
suing caused them some specific injury.190 This is sometimes referred 
to as an “individual causation” requirement.191 In most cases, it is not 
sufficient for plaintiffs to prove that the defendant was the member of 
a group, all of whom were engaging in activities that combined to 
cause the plaintiff harm.192 That could be a roadblock for tort claims 
like those in the Comer and Connecticut cases, where the plaintiffs 
sued several defendants who may have contributed to the problems 
that caused the plaintiffs’ harm, but where the plaintiffs would be 
hard pressed to prove that any particular defendant caused a specific 
individual harm to them. It could be less problematic in private 
                                                                                                                 
 189. Id. §§ 431–33.  
 190. Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual Causation Requirement in Mass Products 
Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873, 874 (2005).  
 191. Id. As Professor Gifford notes, academics who adopt an “instrumentalist” theory of tort law are 
less likely to demand proof of “individual causation” than those who adopt a “corrective justice” theory 
of tort law. Id. at 877. Instrumental theorists believe that tort law pursues social policy objectives that 
are external to the legal system, such as wealth maximization, accident prevention, or distribution of 
losses over a widespread basis. Id. at 876. Corrective justice theorists believe that tort law is designed to 
require injuring parties to repair the losses caused by their wrongful conduct. Id. at 877. For corrective 
justice theorists, individual causation is essential for that goal. Id.  
 192. There is one traditional exception, set forth in the landmark case of Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 
(Cal. 1948). In that case, when two hunters acted negligently towards the plaintiff, but the plaintiff was 
shot by only one bullet, the court shifted the burden to the defendants to prove that they were not the 
factual cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 3–5. In many cases where plaintiffs may try to use common 
law to prevent broader environmental problems, though, it may be unlikely that a court would apply the 
rule from Summers v. Tice to ease the plaintiff’s burden of proving individual causation. There are two 
important differences between that case and many of the potential environmental common law actions. 
First, in Summers v. Tice, at least one defendant, and in fact only one defendant, was the factual cause of 
the plaintiff’s injury. In many of the environmental cases, especially the global warming cases, the harm 
may be caused by some combination of actions by many different defendants, rather than by one 
individual defendant. See Gifford, supra note 190, at 910. Since one of the reasons for shifting the 
burden is the belief that the defendants are in a better position to determine which one actually caused 
the plaintiff’s injury, that rationale is undercut when none of the defendants likely individually caused 
the plaintiff’s harm. Id. Second, in Summers v. Tice, the plaintiffs sued every person that could have 
been the factual cause of the their injury. In many of the environmental cases, the plaintiff will not sue 
every person that might be the factual cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 911–12. If there are other 
persons who could have caused the plaintiff’s individual harm, it is not fair to put the burden on the 
defendants who have been sued to prove that they are not at fault. Id. 
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nuisance actions to address the “ecological nuisances” discussed 
above.   
Over time, courts have eased the burden on plaintiffs in some 
“mass tort” cases to allow the plaintiffs to recover damages from a 
specific defendant even though they could not prove that the 
defendant individually caused a specific harm to the plaintiff.193 For 
instance, in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, the California Supreme 
Court adopted a “market share liability” theory to allow a plaintiff to 
recover damages for birth defects caused by a type of drug 
manufactured by several defendants, even though the plaintiff could 
not prove which defendant manufactured the drug that caused harm 
to the plaintiff.194 Under the court’s approach, each defendant was 
“held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its 
share of [the market for the drug] unless [the defendant] demonstrates 
that it could not have made the product which caused [the] plaintiff’s 
injury.”195  
Similarly, in an earlier case, Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & 
Co., a federal district court in New York adopted an “enterprise 
liability” theory, allowing a plaintiff to proceed with a products 
liability suit against several manufacturers of blasting caps, even 
though the plaintiff could not demonstrate which manufacturer 
produced the blasting caps that injured the plaintiff.196  
However, those theories have only been used in very limited 
situations, usually involving medical malpractice.197 In the context of 
nuisance law or addressing environmental problems, courts have 
                                                                                                                 
 193. See Gifford, supra note 190, at 878–80, 901–02.  
 194. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).  
 195. Id. at 937. Although the theory has been rejected in most contexts other than the DES context, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a similar approach in 2005 in Thomas v. Mallet, 701 N.W.2d 
523, 533 (Wis. 2005), to allow a childhood lead poisoning victim’s case against manufacturers of lead 
pigment to proceed even though the plaintiff could not identify which of the defendants manufactured 
the specific product that caused the plaintiff’s injuries. The “risk contribution” approach adopted by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court is a little different from the market share approach, though, because the court 
instructs the jury, when assigning percentages of liability to the defendants, to consider the relative 
degree of egregiousness of each defendant’s conduct in addition to its market share. Id. at 551. 
 196. Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)  
 197. See Gifford, supra note 190, at 904–15.  
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adopted none of those theories, and it is unlikely that those theories 
will be expanded to cover such areas in the future.198  
Assuming courts will require plaintiffs to prove “individual 
causation,” additional roadblocks may arise in the broader public 
nuisance cases, like Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 
regarding the type of evidence that the plaintiffs may rely upon to 
prove causation. In that case, as in Massachusetts v. EPA, the 
plaintiffs relied, in part, on findings and conclusions of state, federal, 
and international regulators, including findings of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the National 
Academy of Sciences.199 Some courts may rule that such evidence is 
inadmissible to prove that a defendant’s action caused harm to an 
individual plaintiff because (1) the threshold for the agency’s 
determination that an activity may cause a harm is lower than the 
threshold that would apply to proof of causation in tort; or (2) the 
agency’s determination focuses on whether an activity in general can 
cause a harm, rather than on whether the specific activity in question 
causes the plaintiff’s harm.200 In each of those situations, a court may 
conclude that the prejudicial nature of the evidence outweighs its 
relevance.201 Similar problems could arise for plaintiffs in private 
nuisance actions for “ecological nuisances” to the extent that they 
rely too heavily on regulatory findings and conclusions. 
B.  Standing and Justiciability  
Although the Second Circuit’s Connecticut decision and the 
recently vacated Fifth Circuit Comer decision provided public 
nuisance plaintiffs with reasons to be optimistic on standing, the 
cases did not remove all barriers to standing. Both cases involved 
challenges to standing at the pleading stage, so the courts adopted a 
                                                                                                                 
 198. Id. at 904–15, 933.  
 199. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 317 (2d Cir. 2009); Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 507 (2007).  
 200. See Gilbert S. Keteltas & Joanne Lichtman, Are Regulatory Findings Admissible Evidence?, 34:3 
LITIG., SPRING 2008, at 39, 40–41.  
 201. Id. at 43. 
40
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 3
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss3/3
2011] COMMON LAW REMEDIES  
 
605
very lenient standard of review.202 Even in those cases, it is not clear 
that the courts would find that the plaintiffs had standing if the 
challenges were raised on summary judgment or at trial, stages when 
the court would apply a more demanding standard.203 Further, even 
though those decisions seem to be clearly consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA,204 the district 
courts in the Ninth Circuit adopted a more demanding test for 
standing and it is unclear what standing analysis the Fifth Circuit will 
adopt in Comer when the court rehears the case en banc.205  
Even if courts adopt the standing analysis that the Second Circuit 
adopted in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., plaintiffs 
may find it difficult to establish standing in public nuisance cases 
where the defendants’ actions increase their risk of harm, but they 
have not yet suffered the harm.206 Finally, if private parties, rather 
than governments, sue for public nuisance, they may still encounter 
problems demonstrating that the injury they have suffered is different 
in kind from the injuries suffered by the public as a whole.207 
                                                                                                                 
 202. See supra notes 67, 99 and accompanying text. 
 203. However, the court’s decisions in those cases were significant not simply because they found that 
the plaintiffs had standing, but because of the analysis that they used to make that determination. In both 
cases, the courts adopted the Massachusetts v. EPA approach to find (1) that the defendants’ actions 
“caused” the plaintiffs’ harm even though other actions combined with the defendants’ actions to cause 
the harm, and (2) that the plaintiffs’ harm could be redressed by the relief that they sought even though 
imposing sanctions on the defendants would not completely cure the plaintiffs’ injuries. See supra notes 
78–82, 100–08 and accompanying text. Even though courts may require more factual support for the 
plaintiffs’ allegations at a later stage of the litigation, the analysis that courts use to determine whether 
the defendants’ actions cause the plaintiffs harm should not change. Similarly, the analysis that courts 
use to determine whether the relief that the plaintiffs seek redresses their harm should not change. 
 204. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).  
 205. Lower courts might conclude that the standing analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA should be 
limited to suits brought by states, in light of the Court’s reference to the “special solicitude” accorded to 
states in the standing analysis. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 206. The American Electric court did not determine whether an increased risk of harm constituted an 
“injury in fact” for purposes of standing. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 344 n.21 
(2d Cir. 2009). 
 207. Courts have interpreted the “different-in-kind” requirement narrowly to limit the circumstances 
in which private parties can bring public nuisance actions. See Mandy Garrels, Raising Environmental 
Justice Claims Through the Law of Public Nuisance, 20 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 163, 173 (2009). Mandy 
Garrels criticizes the narrow interpretation as frustrating the pursuit of public nuisance actions by 
environmental justice advocates, and she notes that the state of Hawaii has adopted a rule that allows 
any person who has suffered an injury in fact caused by the defendant’s actions to pursue a public 
nuisance action against the defendant. Id. at 178–80. 
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Standing should be less problematic in the context of private nuisance 
actions brought to address “ecological nuisances.” 
In addition to potential standing impediments, justiciability claims 
could still derail public nuisance actions to address broader 
environmental problems when the plaintiffs are turning to public 
nuisance because public law is nonexistent or not enforced. Just as 
there appears to be disagreement within the circuits regarding 
whether public nuisance claims to address global climate change are 
justiciable,208 similar disagreements could arise if plaintiffs turn to 
public nuisance actions to address other environmental problems that 
are being intentionally ignored by the legislative and executive 
branches.209 In those cases, academics suggest that courts are more 
likely to find that the claims are justiciable when the plaintiffs seek 
money damages than when the plaintiffs seek injunctive relief.210 
Once again, private nuisance actions to address “ecological 
nuisances” are less likely to be challenged as raising non-justiciable 
political questions. 
C.  Regulating the Manufacture of Products Through Nuisance Law  
Public nuisance lawsuits that challenge the manufacture of 
products, like the California v. General Motors Corp. case, as 
opposed to the use of products, could face roadblocks in addition to 
the standing, justiciability, and causation problems identified above. 
                                                                                                                 
 208. See supra notes 57, 98, 122, 134–35 and accompanying text.  
 209. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.  
 210. See Zasloff, supra note 17, at 1838–39; Abate, supra note 17, at 612, 627. In discussing the 
benefits of seeking money damages as opposed to an emissions cap in public nuisance actions relating to 
global climate change, Professor Randall Abate writes: 
The litigation strategy to pursue damages rather than injunctive relief is likely a 
successful approach to avoid the political question doctrine concerns . . . . Courts are 
empowered to decide tort cases, and only need to find unreasonable harm to award 
damages. The state is not seeking a comprehensive solution to climate change in seeking 
damages . . . . 
Id. at 627. However, the district court in California v. General Motors Corp. found the claims non-
justiciable even though the plaintiff was only seeking money damages, rather than an injunction. 
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *22–30 (N.D. 
Sept. 17, Cal. 2007). 
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Opponents argue that it is inappropriate to apply public nuisance law 
to the manufacture of products for several reasons.211 
First, they argue that it is an unlawful attempt to avoid limits on 
lawsuits against manufacturers that are built into products liability 
law, including statutes of limitations, notice requirements, and 
defenses based on the plaintiff’s conduct or exhaustion.212 More 
significantly, it allows plaintiffs to avoid demonstrating that the 
defendant’s product was defective, a fundamental requirement of 
products liability law.213 Opponents fear that allowing plaintiffs to 
pursue public nuisance actions against companies based on the 
manufacture of products would blur the line between public nuisance 
and products liability, leading to ambiguous and unmanageable 
precedent.214 They argue that public nuisance is an amorphous and 
poorly defined tort that gives judges too much discretion to find that 
the manufacture of products is unreasonable.215 
CONCLUSION 
While the impediments outlined in the preceding section may 
continue to limit the effectiveness of common law actions to achieve 
broad environmental protection goals in the long-term, they are not 
preventing plaintiffs from turning to the common law in the short-
term to address problems not addressed by public law. Public 
nuisance actions to address climate change may ultimately fail in 
court but may spur changes in public law, which may be the primary 
benefit of this minor renaissance of the common law. It will probably 
                                                                                                                 
 211. See Abate, supra note 17, at 626; Gifford, supra note 190, at 925–29; see also Victor E. 
Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining Rational Boundaries on a 
Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541 (2006). 
 212. E.g., Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 211, at 552, 578–79. 
 213. Id. at 578–79. 
 214. See Abate, supra note 17, at 626; Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 211, at 541.  
 215. See Abate, supra note 17, at 626; Gifford, supra note 190, at 748, 786; Schwartz & Goldberg, 
supra note 211, at 541, 579. In contrast, Professor Abate believes that public nuisance should play a 
valuable role in regulating the manufacture of products. He argues that “like all common law principles, 
public nuisance doctrine needs to evolve and grow to respond to the changing needs of our society. . . . 
Traditional federal and state legislative responses are important, but those processes move very slowly 
and do not always offer meaningful recourse for the impacts in our backyards.” See Abate, supra note 
17, at 626–27.  
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not be the only benefit, however. As described above, while plaintiffs 
may face significant impediments in public nuisance actions to 
address climate change, they may have greater success using private 
nuisance law to address narrower environmental problems not 
addressed adequately by public law. Litigants could have great 
success bringing “ecological nuisance” actions to address the very 
real local effects of national environmental problems caused by lax 
regulation of non-point source pollution and development of sensitive 
ecosystems, as well as the abdication of regulation of isolated 
wetlands and non-navigable streams. Those victories would be 
valuable in their own right, but might also lead to changes in public 
law to address those problems. It is not clear how successful plaintiffs 
will be in pursuing common law environmental claims over the next 
few years. It is clear, however, that the common law and public law 
will only become stronger because litigants can pursue claims under 
both. 
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